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Abstract 
The admissible rate of criminal evidence against intruders has continued to generate classical arguments because the 
reports extracted from intrusion logs are often disputed in many courts of law. Besides, forensic experts still spend 
excessive resources to prepare reports for litigation before intruders can be charged. Thus, we propose Forenlog 
Analyzer to lessen the aforementioned problems. The pattern of attacks in an intrusion log is partitioned into sixty 
subgroups according to the values held in the timestamp of the evidence and the overall uncertainty of the pattern is 
subsequently computed. Evaluation illustrates that neither the internal attributes nor the external attributes of attacks 
are sufficient to litigate intruders in courts of laws in all cases. The results further demonstrate that forensic analysts 
should not just destroy, include or ignore supportive evidence on the basis of their sizes without determine their 
inherent uncertainty.  
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1. Introduction 
Computer crimes and related offences are global threats to many private and corporate organizations [1], 
[2]. Accordingly, governments and law enforcement agencies are aggressively making efforts to 
subjugate their waves through investments in measures such as collaborative research, surveillance and 
lit igation teams, computer security and best industrial standards [14]. However, it is worrisome that 
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intruders frequently circumvent some of the existing preventive measures [4].   Unfortunately, majority of 
the existing tools for generating forensic reports  are fraught with numerous drawbacks  [1], [3], [4], [7]. 
For instance, most of them are unable to discern informative logs from less informative logs  [9], [10]. In 
addition, they are practically  ineffective to compare d ifferent patterns of intrusion logs together. Hence, 
analysts waste numerous resources to analyze intrusion logs [2], [3], [7], [11] in attempts to extract 
admissible evidence to lit igate intruders. Intrusion logs generally  raise several fo rmal object ions in courts 
of laws and witnesses to several suits relating to computer crimes easily discredit some attributes in the 
intrusion logs as improper evidence. Hence, it is easy for witnesses to persuade the courts to overrule the 
legality of the entire logs as illegal and impropriety acts that are purportedly gathered to demean or 
incarcerate their clients. Forensic reports must meet required standards by the law [13] [15] [8] [11].   
      For these reasons, this paper proposes Forenlog Analyzer for supporting ext raction of 
criminal evidence against intruders. We adopt Snort IDS [12] to generate forensic datasets  and apply our 
model to each dataset. The contributions of this paper include its  ability  to augment existing models to 
extract uncertainty inherent in a collection of intrusion logs . Furthermore, the paper describes two 
practical methods for comparing patterns of attacks across different forensic datasets. The remainders of 
this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Sect ion 3 discusses methods 
proposed in this paper and datasets that we use to evaluate the models. Section 4 will discuss the results 
obtained and their benefits to the computer security and forensics analysts  while section 5 summarizes the 
paper and proposes areas for future research that can be carried out to enhance the quality of this paper. 
2. Related work  
      Forensic professionals may decide to adopt research, commercial or locally developed toolkits to 
complement their findings  [7] because each approach has its merits and demerits .  Hence, a lgorithms for 
reducing phishing attacks that are associated with websites have been formulated in a recent time [1]. The 
algorithms use clustering techniques to analyze the content of each email letter and filter out suspicious 
mails that match some inbuilt ru les.  Nevertheless, the model may be augmented to detect stealthy 
intruders that want to circumvent websites to launch phishing or masquerading attacks to steal user’s 
details.  A model for clustering domains that generate junk e-mails in order to terminate spam hosts has 
been developed [4]. The model clusters  spam hosts according to their IP addresses and the subject of each 
email. The t rouble with this approach is that it tends to be ineffective for investigating some realistic cases 
given the fact that intruders can use specialized tools to craft and randomize IP addresses. Some 
suspicious emails do not have heading while some emails possess fragmented headings. It is  argued that 
forensic experts will need models that will substantiate the relationship between the quantity of forensic 
data and the degree of investigations  that are required for conducting log analysis [17]. Yet, the efficacy 
of such model is subjective for investigating intrusions that require unpredictable depth of investigations. 
    Besides, there are numerous commercial toolkits that can be used to analyze fo rensic data [17] but they 
commonly have different strengths and functionalities. Some of them leverage on capabilities to 
aggregate data from multip le sources, correlate events and turn data into charts. We observe that majority 
of commercial p roducts employ visualizat ion and some data min ing techniques. However, they are 
proprietary products that require frequent upgrade and license fees. Security and privacy issues are central 
concerns to web-based commercial products for forensic analyses of intrusion logs.  
3. The Principles of Forenlog Analyzer 
 We extend Shannon’s information theory to evaluate the patterns of attacks that are identified in a set 
of forensic datasets [6]. Informat ion theory is useful for supporting decision making processes [16]. By 
using the values held in the timestamp of each suspicious packet that migrates from its source (S) to its 
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target (D) in any computer network, in Figure (1) for instance, all the alerts in the log can be partitioned 
into clustering schemes and the probability of each clustering scheme can be computed. It is practical to 
adopt two methods to extract patterns of attacks from the same forensic data and also compute the 
uncertainty for patterns of attacks in the dataset. We define the uncertainty of patterns of attacks in a 
forensic data as the representation of the variability of the intrusions in the dataset [9]. The premise is that 
attacks have hidden patterns that can be divided into smaller and smaller sub -patterns. The likelihood of 
each sub-pattern or subgroup may be dissimilar or similar. Hence, analyst must be able to establish such 
variations and similarit ies as the case may be in o rder to support court cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   Fig. 1. Process flow 
 
Therefore, the uncertainty [6] of patterns of attacks in a forensic dataset is expressed as follows: 
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Where ti and )( itp are the respective ith and their corresponding probabilities across all clustering 
schemes of a forensic dataset. Their sums are taken over all the values of the sixty clustering schemes that 
form the pattern of forensic dataset that we evaluate in this paper.   
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Fig. 2. ForenLog analyzer 
       
       We ext ract cctf-defcon8, cctf-defcon10  and cctf-defcon11 datasets that were logged during Capture 
The Flag Contest (CTFC) [5] to evaluate the model p roposes in this paper. The cctf-defcon8 dataset 
contains buffer over flow, password guessing, spoofing attacks, etc [5]. Attacks in cctf-defcon10 dataset 
relate to probing attacks such as telnet/FTP-related attacks, sessions and MTU-related attacks while cctf-
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defcon11 has damaged packets that were launched for about 37 hours [5]. The datasets are unzipped and 
current version of Snort is installed to sniff each dataset in offline and intrusion detection modes.   
     Additionally, Forenlog Analyzer has input, output and an analysis engine as shown in Figures 2 and 
3. Its analysis engine is subdivided into clustering, pattern, statistical and validator agents. The clustering 
agent accepts alerts from each dataset as its input data from the input mode and partitions them into sixty 
subgroups.  The statistical agent accepts input from the clustering agent and uses the quantity of alerts per 
clustering scheme to compute the likelihoods of the attacks in the dataset. The statistical agent uses the 
likelihoods of the attacks to compute their uncertainties. Thereafter, the pattern agent uses the quantity of 
alerts per clustering scheme and their respective likelihoods of occurrences to establish the patterns of 
attacks in the dataset.  The validator agent validates the outputs of both methods for deriv ing patterns with 
each other and reports any discrepancy as an invalid pattern.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Execution of Forenlog Analyzer 
4. Analysis of results 
Documentation of findings without any ambiguity is a vital step in computer forensic analysis of 
intrusion logs in general [3]. However, due to limited space,  we will only p rovide few of the relevant 
analyses that we have carried out from the above experimensts. There are differences in the values held 
by attributes of attacks in all the above datasets in most cases. 
Table 1. Overview of datasets 
Dataset Total alerts Uncertainty 
Cctf-defcon8 909648 5.620 
Cctf-defcon10 4919 15.761 
Cctf-defcon11 8427 5.439 
 
In Table 1, forensic experts can gather more evidence in an informative dataset than in a dataset that is not 
informat ive because less informative datasets are indicative of repeated events. Such evidence will be 
useful for supporting reports during investigation of bunched attacks that overload computer resources 
with d isruptive packets. Indicative of fewer items to be included in the reports involving Cctf-defcon11 is 
given by its uncertainty that is lesser than the uncertainty of other datasets.  Cct f-defcon11 might be easier 
to analyze than Cctf-defcon8 dataset that has lesser uncertainty of 5.620.  
     The 'Left pattern' and Right pattern’ in figure 4 to figure 6 respectively signify the probablity 
distributions and the quantity of alerts (attacks) in each dataset.  Analysts must be prudent in the course of 
analyzing Cctf-defcon10 due to its variability when compared with cctf-defcon8 dataset. Visual display of 
patterns of attacks in cctf-defcon8 dataset shows that they are slighly d isorganized than patterns of attacks 
in cctf-defcon11. 
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                     Fig. 4. (a) Left pattern; (b) Right pattern 
Essentially, table (1) illustrates that Cctf-defcon10 is more informat ive than the other two datasets  while 
figures 4 to 6 show patterns of attacks in the above datasets.  
 
                                  Fig. 5. (a) Left  pattern; (b) Right pattern     
 
                                                    Fig. 6. (a) Left  pattern; (b) Right pattern 
5. Conclusion 
      The increasing waves of computer crimes across the globe can be checkmated with collaborative 
strategies. It will be painfu l for a court to invalidate cases of intrusions as a result of the fact that forensic 
experts erroneously extract  data that lacks admissible proofs. Regrettably, plaintiffs that are courageous 
enough to charge the suspects to courts may suffer compensation fines for defamation of characters in 
such aforementioned scenario.  Therefore, this paper proposes Forenlog Analyzer to support human 
analysts that want to generate reports that will substantiate prima facie cases again computer intruders .   
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      Evaluation with different intrusion logs illustrates the significant of patterns and uncertainty for 
supporting extraction of criminal evidence against intruders. The results suggest that human analysts will 
have to discard several items in the logs of Cctf-defcon11 dataset compare to the logs of Cctf-defcon8 and 
Cctf-defcon10 datasets.  The findings establish that more items can be included in the reports from the 
Cctf-defcon10 dataset that has the highest uncertainty than other datasets that were rev iewed in this paper.  
Contrarily, the results suggest that human analysts must be careful to analyze Cctf-defcon10 due to its 
heterogeneity.  It is suggested that it is unlawfu l to invent evidence for court purpose.  We further suggest 
that analyst must be guided by ethics of the profession at all time irrespective of the constraints that 
surround the issues under review. The computers that are compromised can further be investigated 
remotely or locally if possible. The reports obtained together with CCTV footage can be used to augment 
methods described in this paper.  However, the approaches described in this paper are independent of 
sources of the forensic datasets. We intend to explore the possibilities that different attributes of intrusions 
may reveal d ifferent patterns  to enhance the efficacy of this paper in future.  
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